Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-07

ESSAY
SOFTENING VOTER ID LAWS THROUGH LITIGATION:
IS IT ENOUGH?

Richard L. Hasen
rhasen@law.uci.edu

University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law

The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2743946

Preliminary draft: August 11, 2016
Please do not cite or quote without permission
Forthcoming: WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW FORWARD (2016)

ESSAY
SOFTENING VOTER ID LAWS THROUGH LITIGATION: IS IT ENOUGH?
RICHARD L. HASEN *
INTRODUCTION
Headlines about voter identification laws often place court rulings in a
simple win or loss frame. For example, the New York Times headline describing the
result in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 1 a 2008 case involving the
constitutionality of Indiana’s strict voter identification law, read: In a 6-3 Vote,
Justices Uphold a Voter ID Law. 2 Similarly, in reporting on the 2015 decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit involving Texas’ voter
identification law, the Associated Press article was headlined Federal Court Strikes
Down Tough Texas Voter ID Law. 3
In fact, the results in both cases were more nuanced. As reporter Linda
Greenhouse explained in that New York Times article, 4 the Supreme Court decision
in Crawford was fractured. Although a majority of the Court rejected a full facial
challenge to Indiana’s law on equal protection grounds, a plurality of the Court, as
well as the dissenters, left open the possibility that Indiana’s law could be
unconstitutional “as applied” to certain voters who faced special burdens in getting
a voter identification card. 5 Further, although the Fifth Circuit did hold in Veasey
v. Abbott 6 that Texas’s voter identification law violated Section 2 of the Voting
*

Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. I presented an
earlier version of this paper at “Casting Votes, Counting Votes for Election 2016: Democracy and
Law in Action,” April 1-2, 2016, sponsored by The Institute for Legal Studies at the University of
Wisconsin School of Law. Thanks to Josh Douglas, Bill Groth, Sam Issacharoff, Rick Pildes, Nick
Stephanopoulos, and Kathleen Unger for useful comments and suggestions, and to Nassim
Alisobhani for research assistance.
1
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
2
Linda Greenhouse, In a 6-3 Vote, Justices Uphold a Voter ID Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/washington/29scotus.html (“The 6-to-3 ruling kept the door
open to future lawsuits that provided more evidence. But this theoretical possibility was small
comfort to the dissenters or to critics of voter ID laws, who predicted that a more likely outcome
than successful lawsuits would be the spread of measures that would keep some legitimate wouldbe voters from the polls.”).
3
Associated Press, Federal Court Strikes Down Tough Texas Voter ID Law, NBC News, Aug. 5,
2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-court-strikes-down-tough-texas-voter-id-lawn404711.
4
Greenhouse, supra note 2.
5
Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd, 553 U.S. 181, 199-203 (2008).
6
796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Rights Act, 7 the appeals court determined that the appropriate remedy would not
be a wholesale abandonment of the law; instead it directed the lower federal district
court to allow Texas to use its law in most instances, but to craft a remedy which
would allow those facing special burdens additional ways to prove identity and cast
a ballot. 8 (The Fifth Circuit, after rehearing the case en banc, ordered a similar
remedy 9, and the trial court, with the cooperation of the parties, implemented an
affidavit alternative in time for the November 2016 election. 10)
In theory, softening of voter identification laws through litigation is a
positive development aimed at avoiding disenfranchisement of both voters who
face special burdens obtaining an acceptable government-issued identification
necessary to vote and of those voters who face confusion or administrative error. In
practice, however, softening may do less to alleviate the actual burdens of voter
identification laws than to make judges feel better about their Solomonic rulings.
In fact, softening devices still leave an uncertain number voters disenfranchised.
These burdens might be justified if there were evidence that state voter
identification laws solve a serious problem, but there is no such evidence.
This brief Essay first describes the theoretical softening which emerged in
some voter identification litigation. It then explains that, at least to this point, such
softening offers less than meets the eye in helping voters facing difficulties voting
in states with strict voter identification requirements. It concludes that courts should
strike down strict voter identification laws, because the laws deprive at least some
voters of the ability to cast a valid vote for no good reason, and the softening devices
do not yet appear to do enough.

I.
SOFTENING IN THEORY
The Indiana and Texas litigation show how litigation, at least in theory, can
lead to softening of the harshest aspects of state voter identification laws. 11
Indiana is important because it was one of the first states with Republican
legislative and gubernatorial control 12 to adopt strict voter identification

7

Id. at 513.
Id. at 519.
9
Veasey v. Abbott, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 3923868, *36-39 (5th Cir. Jul. 20, 2016).
10
Veasey v. Abbott, Order Regarding Agreed Interim Plan for Elections, Case 2:13—cv-00193,
Doc. 895, (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2016), available at: http://electionlawblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/texas-id-order.pdf.
11
The next few paragraphs draws from RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION & ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS ch. 12 (2014).
12
Georgia was another early adopter. On the history of Georgia’s fight over its voter identification
laws, see ARI BERMAN: GIVE US THE BALLOT ch. 8 (2015).
8
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requirements following the disputed 2000 election and the rise of the voting wars. 13
The ACLU and other organizations brought suit in federal court against Indiana’s
law, arguing that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The case was a facial challenge—that is, a challenge to the law as
applied to everyone. This is in contrast to an as-applied challenge, which argues
that the law is unconstitutional as applied to a person or class of people.
The case proceeded without much evidence on both sides. The state could
point to no evidence that impersonation fraud (where one person goes to the polls
claiming to be someone else) was a problem. Indeed, the state conceded there were
no cases of such impersonation fraud in Indiana. But the trial court found plaintiffs’
lawyers could not produce voters who (1) lacked identification; (2) would have a
difficult time getting identification; and (3) wanted to vote. Plaintiffs claimed they
did not need to produce such evidence because they were bringing a facial
challenge. 14
A federal district court rejected plaintiffs’ challenge citing a lack of
evidence on plaintiffs’ side. 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion. 16 When the case made it to the Supreme
Court, the Court divided 3-3-3. Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, applying an intermediate standard of scrutiny, 17
rejected the facial challenge to the law but left open the possibility of new plaintiffs
facing significant burdens from the identification law (such as those who could not
afford the underlying documents needed to get a free voter identification card) to
bring an as-applied challenge to the law. 18 The plurality held that the burden most
voters faced was minor and the law was justified by important enough state interests
in preventing voter fraud and instilling state confidence. “For most voters who need
them, the inconvenience of making a trip to the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles],
gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not
qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant
increase over the usual burdens of voting.” 19
13

I trace the history from 2000 through 2012 in RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS (2012).
For a general history of the Crawford litigation, see Joshua A. Douglas, The History of Voter ID
Laws and the Story of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 453, in ELECTION LAW STORIES
(Joshua A. Douglas and Eugene Mazo eds. 2016).
15
Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
16
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
17
The court adopted intermediate scrutiny by applying a flexible standard in which the level of
scrutiny rises as voters are more heavily burdened. This flexible standard is commonly referred to
as the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. For background see HASEN, supra note 11, at 260-62, 30709.
18
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (contrasting facial challenge to as applied challenge as described in
Court’s earlier case, Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 1184
(2008)).
19
Id. at 198.
14
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Justice Scalia, writing for himself, Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas, took
a different view. Like the plurality, he believed the law imposed little burden on
most voters. On this basis, however, Justice Scalia would have upheld the law
against a rational basis review, not the intermediate scrutiny used by the plurality. 20
Unlike the plurality, the Scalia opinion seems to leave no opening for as-applied
challenges for voters facing special burdens in obtaining the right form of
identification.
The three dissenting Justices—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter—
agreed with the Justice Stevens plurality opinion that a higher level of scrutiny
applied. The dissenters believed that the law imposed greater burdens on many
voters, and that the state failed to demonstrate that its interests were strong enough
to defeat the plaintiffs. The dissenters would have struck down the law facially, for
all voters in Indiana. 21
By the time Texas came to adopt a voter identification law in 2011, 22 it
adopted a much stricter one than Indiana, further limiting the forms of acceptable
government-issued identification, and not including an exception or exemption,
such as the one built into the Indiana law, for those who are indigent. 23 The effort
to pass the Texas law was a fierce partisan battle, featuring a Democratic state
senator being wheeled on a gurney following liver surgery in the state capitol
rotunda to block the law’s passage. Eventually Texas Republicans changed the
Senate rules to allow the law to pass despite united Democratic opposition. 24
At the time Texas passed its law, it was still subject to the preclearance
requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 25 Under Section 5 of the Act, covered
jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting such as Texas had to
20

Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 209-37 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22
Act of May 16, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 123, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 619.
23
The trial court considering the challenge to Texas’s voter identification law found it to be the
strictest in the United States. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 642-43 (S.D. Texas 2014). See
also Erik Eckholm, Texas ID Law Called Breach of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/us/appellate-panel-says-texas-id-law-broke-us-voting-rightsact.html (“The Texas ID law is one of the strictest of its kind in the country. It requires voters to
bring a government-issued photo ID to the polls. Accepted forms of identification include a driver’s
license, a United States passport, a concealed-handgun license and an election identification
certificate issued by the State Department of Public Safety.”); National Conference of State
Legislatures, Voter Identification Requirements/Voter ID Laws, Jan. 4, 2016,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx (classifying Texas’s law as
“strict;” and noting that, among strict voter identification states, only Indiana and Tennessee have
an indigency exemption) (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
24
See HASEN, supra note 13, at 41-43 (discussing passage of voter identification law in Texas).
25
United States Department of Justice, Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5 at the Time
of the Shelby County Decision, https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-coveredsection-5 (listing Texas) (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
21
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obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice or a three-judge
federal court in Washington D.C. Covered jurisdictions had the burden of
demonstrating that the law did not have the purpose and would not have the effect
of making protected minority voters worse off in exercising their voting rights. 26
The Department of Justice blocked Texas’s law, known as “SB 14,” finding
that the state did not meet its burden of proof. Texas appealed to a three-judge
federal district court in Washington D.C. 27 After trial, the three-judge court blocked
Texas’s law, finding the evidence uncertain, but siding against Texas because of
the burden of proof. 28 Texas appealed to the Supreme Court, which later remanded
the case for dismissal after holding in an unrelated case out of Alabama, Shelby
County v. Holder, 29 that the preclearance provisions of the law were
unconstitutional. 30 Shelby County held that the formula used to decide which
jurisdictions were covered was constitutionally outdated and therefore exceeded
congressional power by infringing on the “equal sovereignty” of the states. 31
Within hours of the Shelby County decision, Texas’s then-attorney general (and
now governor) Greg Abbott announced the state’s intention to enforce its voter
identification law immediately. 32
A diverse group of voting rights plaintiffs then challenged the law in federal
court, raising a variety of theories, arguing the law violated constitutional equal
protection rights, the twenty-fourth amendment’s prohibition of poll taxes, and
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In a detailed 142-page opinion, the federal
district court held Texas’s law illegal. The Court found it was passed with racially
discriminatory intent in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote, amounted to an unconstitutional poll
tax, and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 33
26

On the former Section 5 requirements, see United States Department of Justice, About Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016).
27
Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118-20 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct.
2886 (2013).
28
Id. at 144–45.
29
133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
30
Texas v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).
31
For a critique of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shelby County, see Richard L. Hasen, Shelby
County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014).
32
Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Decision, GUARDIAN,
Jun. 25, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-supreme-courtdecision (“The Texas attorney general, Greg Abbott, declared that in the light of the supreme court’s
judgment striking down a key element of the 1965 Voting Rights Act he was implementing instantly
the voter ID law that had previously blocked by the Obama administration. ‘With today's decision,
the state's voter ID law will take effect immediately. Photo identification will now be required when
voting in elections in Texas.’”).
33
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).
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Texas appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit held that the district
court used an incorrect standard to conclude that Texas had a racially
discriminatory purpose in passing the voter identification law. 34 After a lengthy
analysis, the court concluded that Texas did violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act on grounds that, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the law made it
harder for minority voters compared to white voters to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 35 The Court declined to reach
constitutional arguments made by the plaintiffs 36 other than the poll tax argument
under the twenty-fourth amendment. The court rejected the poll tax argument on
two grounds. First, the court held that the indirect costs of obtaining identification
do not provide grounds for a facial poll tax attack on a voter identification law. 37
Further, the court held that a law Texas enacted after litigation began, which
allowed voters to obtain from Texas government offices an “Election Identification
Certificate” (or EIC) at no cost, meant the Texas identification requirement was not
a poll tax: “Texas law no longer imposes any direct fee for any of the documentation
required to obtain a qualifying voter ID.” 38 Texas voters seeking the EIC, however,
may still face fees in obtaining the underlying documentation necessary to qualify
for an EIC by proving United States citizenship and identity. 39 The Fifth Circuit
concluded, however, that this indirect burden did not constitute a poll tax.
Despite holding that Texas’s voter identification law violated Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, the Fifth Circuit did not enjoin enforcement of the law
outright. Instead, the court remanded the case to the trial court to impose a much
more limited remedy, consistent with the idea that a court fashioning a section 2
remedy should respect the legislature’s policy objectives when possible: 40
Accordingly, if on remand the district court finds that SB 14 has only
violated Section 2 through its discriminatory effects, it should refer to the
policies underlying SB 14 in fashioning a remedy. Clearly, the Legislature
wished to reduce the risk of in-person voter fraud by strengthening the
forms of identification presented for voting. Simply reverting to the system
34

Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 498-504 (5th Cir. 2015). The court remanded the case to the trial
court to reconsider the discriminatory purpose question under the correct legal standard. Id. at 50304.
35
Id. at 504-13.
36
Id. at 514.
37
Id. at 515.
38
Id. at 516-17.
39
The Texas Administrative Code, title 37, section 15.182 lists the acceptable forms of
documentation
to
prove
citizenship
and
identity.
http://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=
&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=37&pt=1&ch=15&rl=182.
40
Veasey, 706 F.3d. at 517-18.
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in place before SB 14’s passage would not fully respect these policy
choices—it would allow voters to cast ballots after presenting less secure
forms of identification like utility bills, bank statements, or paychecks. One
possibility would be to reinstate voter registration cards as documents that
qualify as acceptable identification under the Texas Election Code. The
court could also decree that, upon execution of an affidavit that a person
does not have an acceptable form of photo identification, that person must
be allowed to vote with their voter registration card. Such a remedy would
respect the Legislature's choice to do away with more problematic forms of
identification, while also eliminating SB 14’s invalid applications.
However, we recognize that the district court must assess this potential
solution in light of other solutions posited by the parties, including other
forms of photo identification. We urge the parties to work cooperatively
with the district court to provide a prompt resolution of this matter to avoid
election eve uncertainties and emergencies. 41
After a lengthy delay and prodding from the United States Supreme Court, 42
the entire Fifth Circuit sitting en banc issued a ruling agreeing that Texas’s law
violated the Voting Rights Act because of its racially discriminatory effect, and it
remanded to the trial court to come up with an interim remedy following the narrow
guidelines of the panel decision. 43 The trial court on remand implemented an
affidavit alternative in time for the November 2016 election. 44
The Indiana and Texas cases show that litigation has the potential to lead to
the softening of voter identification laws. In the Indiana case, the Supreme Court
plurality suggested “as applied” litigation to get exemptions and exceptions from
41

Id. at 519.
Veasey v. Abbott, 2016 WL 3923868, *5 (“While this case was awaiting oral argument before
our full court, in light of the upcoming elections in November 2016, the parties applied to the
Supreme Court to vacate the stay of the district court’s injunction that a panel of this court originally
entered in October 2014. The Supreme Court denied the motion to vacate the stay but noted that if,
by July 20, 2016, this court had “neither issued an opinion on the merits of the case nor issued an
order vacating or modifying the current stay order, an aggrieved party [could] seek interim relief
from th[e Supreme] Court by filing an appropriate application.”).
43
Id. at *36-*39. The court also remanded to consider whether Texas engaged in intentional racial
discrimination in voting, a finding which could lead the trial court to throw out Texas’s voting law
entirely and even to put Texas back under federal supervision of its voting rules. Richard L. Hasen,
The Voting Rights Act Might Get Some Teeth Back, SLATE, Jul. 21, 2016,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/07/the_5th_circuit_left_an_o
pening_for_texas_to_lose_control_of_its_discriminatory.html?wpsrc=sh_all_mob_tw_top.
44
Veasey v. Abbott, Order Regarding Agreed Interim Plan for Elections, Case 2:13—cv-00193,
Doc. 895, (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2016), available at: http://electionlawblog.org/wpcontent/uploads/texas-id-order.pdf.
42
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identification requirements for groups of voters facing special burdens. In Texas,
the ongoing litigation led Texas to revise its laws to allow voters to obtain a free
identification card (although there was no free access to the documentation needed
to get an identification), and the Fifth Circuit followed up with an order for the
district court to craft some exemptions and exceptions from the law to make it less
onerous.
This softening of the potentially harsh effects of voter identification laws
through litigation is not unique to Indiana or Texas. In South Carolina, election
administrators enacted administrative rules to allow those voters with a “reasonable
impediment” to obtaining the right voter identification to be allowed to vote without
showing the identification. South Carolina adopted these rules while a three-judge
court in Washington D.C. was considering whether to give federal approval under
the now moribund preclearance rules of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. There
is little doubt South Carolina adopted this softening solely to obtain preclearance
from the court. After the South Carolina softening, the court approved South
Carolina’s voter identification law. 45

45

South Carolina v. U.S., 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012). As concurring judge Bates wrote:
First, to state the obvious, Act R54 as now pre-cleared is not the R54 enacted in May 2011.
It is understandable that the Attorney General of the United States, and then the intervenordefendants in this case, would raise serious concerns about South Carolina’s voter photo
ID law as it then stood. But now, to the credit of South Carolina state officials, Act R54 as
authoritatively interpreted does warrant pre-clearance. An evolutionary process has
produced a law that accomplishes South Carolina’s important objectives while protecting
every individual's right to vote and a law that addresses the significant concerns raised
about Act R54’s potential impact on a group that all agree is disproportionately African–
American. As the Court's opinion convincingly describes, South Carolina's voter photo
ID law, as interpreted, now compares very favorably with the laws of Indiana, Georgia and
New Hampshire, each of which has passed legal muster through either federal court
constitutional review or pre-clearance by the Attorney General. The path to a sound
South Carolina voter photo ID law has been different, given the essential role of the State's
interpretation of key provisions.
Which brings me to my second observation—one cannot doubt the vital function that
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has played here. Without the review process under the
Voting Rights Act, South Carolina's voter photo ID law certainly would have been more
restrictive. Several legislators have commented that they were seeking to structure
a law that could be pre-cleared…. The key ameliorative provisions were added during that
legislative process and were shaped by the need for pre-clearance. And the evolving
interpretations of these key provisions of Act R54, particularly the reasonable impediment
provision, subsequently presented to this Court were driven by South Carolina officials’
efforts to satisfy the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

Id. at 53-54 (Bates, J., concurring).
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North Carolina followed suit a few years later. Thanks to the Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County, 46 North Carolina did not need to submit
its new voter identification law or other voting changes for Section 5 preclearance.
But after voting rights plaintiffs challenged North Carolina’s laws in court under
the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act’s section 2, North Carolina passed
another statute implementing a “reasonable impediment” exemption similar to
South Carolina’s. The change came on the eve of the federal court trial, and the
court put off the part of the trial related to voter identification for a later date.47
Although the district court wrote that the North Carolina “reasonable impediment”
exemption is “identical” to South Carolina’s requirement, it is not. The North
Carolina statute lists specific reasons a voter may claim an impediment, along with
a catch-all “other” provision. 48
The trial court in the North Carolina case held that North Carolina’s voter
identification law, with its reasonable impediment exemption, did not violate the
Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. 49 The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court,
holding that North Carolina passed its law for a racially discriminatory purpose, 50
a holding the state of North Carolina has promised to appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 51 Rather than allow the law to function with the reasonable
impediment exemption, the Fourth Circuit rejected the entire law. 52

46

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL
204481, *1 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (noting that the state opposed motion to enjoin North Carolina voter
identification law, “pointing out that North Carolina's current law permits those without a qualifying
photo ID to vote under a broad “reasonable impediment” exception identical to that approved by a
three-judge court in South Carolina v. United States, 898 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.2012).”); id. at *2
(“Trial was set for July 13, 2015. On June 18, 2015, the North Carolina General Assembly passed
House Bill 836, and on June 22, 2015, the Governor signed it into law as North Carolina Session
Law 2015-103 (‘SL 2015-103’). The law relaxed the photo-ID requirement created by SL 2013-381
by providing an additional exception that permits individuals to vote without a photo ID so long as
they sign a reasonable impediment affidavit.”).
48
NC Code § 163-166.15(e)(1).
49
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL
1650774, *170 (M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d, 2016 WL 4053033 (4th Cir. 2016).
50
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2016 WL 4053033 *2.
51
[Citation coming when emergency motion filed.]
52
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2016 WL 4053033 *22 (“But, even
if the State were able to demonstrate that the amendment lessens the discriminatory effect of the
photo ID requirement, it would not relieve us of our obligation to grant a complete remedy in this
case. That remedy must reflect our finding that the challenged provisions were motivated by an
impermissible discriminatory intent and must ensure that those provisions do not impose any
lingering burden on African American voters. We cannot discern any basis upon which this record
reflects that the reasonable impediment exception amendment fully cures the harm from the photo
ID provision.”).
47
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In Wisconsin, voting rights plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s tough voter
identification law in both state and federal court. A federal court held the law
violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the United States Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause. 53 Meanwhile, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a state
challenge to the voter identification requirements construed its laws and related
regulations to require the Wisconsin Department of Motor Vehicles to exercise
discretion in providing documentation without a fee to voters when the voters
lacked the documentation necessary to secure a state-issued voter identification
card. 54 After this construction of Wisconsin law by the state’s highest court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected both the
constitutional and Voting Rights Act challenges to the law. 55
However, in further proceedings in the case, the Seventh Circuit held its
initial order did not bar plaintiffs’ attempt to bring an as-applied claim against the
Wisconsin law based on how the law was implemented in practice, and the court
remanded the case to the district court to consider such a challenge. 56 It explained:
“The right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other
people can secure the necessary credentials easily. Plaintiffs now accept the
propriety of requiring photo ID from persons who already have or can get it with
reasonable effort, while endeavoring to protect the voting rights of those who
encounter high hurdles. This is compatible with our opinion and mandate, just as it
is compatible with Crawford.” 57
On remand the trial court issued an order allowing Wisconsin voters to sign
a reasonable impediment affidavit to be allowed to vote. 58 The state of Wisconsin
appealed and a Seventh Circuit panel put the affidavit requirement on hold, ruling
that it was likely too broad a remedy for those facing special burdens to vote. 59
Separately, another federal district court required the state of Wisconsin to take
additional steps to help those voters facing special burdens obtain identification to
be used for voting. 60 Both rulings are currently on further appeal.

53

Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wisc. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
54
Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 278-79 (Wisc. 2014).
55
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). The entire Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en
banc by an equally divided 5-5 vote, over a strong dissent, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014). The Supreme
Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
56
Frank v. Walker, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1426486 (7th Cir. 2016).
57
Id. at *2.
58
Frank v. Walker, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 3948068, *2 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
59
[WL cite not yet available: order posted here: http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/7thfrank.pdf]
60
One Wisconsin Institute v. Thomsen, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 4059222, *2 (W.D. Wis.
2016).
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II.
SOFTENING IN PRACTICE
For those who believe voter identification laws impose unnecessary hurdles
to voting, softening through litigation is certainly preferable to no softening. For
example, the South Carolina “reasonable impediment” exemption makes the law
far more palatable than the law without it. And the Wisconsin as-applied litigation
may serve to allow more opportunity for unfairly disenfranchised voters to vote.
But it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which these softening devices
actually alleviate the problems caused by voter identification laws. By “problems,”
I mean not only the disenfranchisement of otherwise eligible voters who lack and
cannot get the right government-issued identification to vote, but also
administrative issues, pollworker errors, and confusion or forgetfulness by voters
which leads to practical disenfranchisement. Further, voter identification laws, even
softened ones, impose burdens on voters, voting rights groups, states, state
agencies, and local governments.
Beginning with Crawford, softening has been underwhelming. Justice
Stevens’ opening to channel voter identification challenges into as-applied
challenges has been completely unsuccessful. Indeed, it is hard to find successful
reported as-applied challenge in the federal or state courts. William Groth, the
lawyer who brought Crawford, reported a single successful as-applied challenge
for a single voter which took two years and considerable effort to bring. 61 There
have been some unsuccessful challenges, such as Stewart v. Marion County, in
which a federal district court rejected an as-applied challenge to Indiana’s voter
identification law, finding the burdens on the plaintiff no more than the burdens

61

Groth explained in an email:
In connection with your new article, you might want to look at a post-Crawford case I
litigated on behalf of an individual who was denied a photo ID because the names on his
birth certificate and Social Security records did not match. The case is Worley v. Waddell,
819 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2011), and 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145049 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
We ended up bringing Worley’s mother up from Georgia to testify before an ALJ that he
was indeed her son and the same person known [] as both Joseph A. Ivey and Joseph A.
Worley. At the end of about two years of litigation the State finally relented, issued my
client his ID, and paid all of Mr. Worley’s attorney fees.
The presiding judge was Sarah Barker, the jurist who decided Crawford in the district court.

Email from Bill Groth to author dated April 18, 2016 (on file with the author).
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that other voters faced which the Supreme Court found to be acceptable in
Crawford. 62
The general failure of as-applied challenges is no surprise. As early as
2009, Julien Kern wrote of the administrative and logistical difficulties of gathering
the most vulnerable potential voters for class action purposes. 63 As Kern put it:
After Crawford, even the most stringent voter identification laws must be
challenged using the blunt tool of an as-applied challenge. Practical
limitations on resources and remedies in an individual as-applied challenge
are strong deterrents to effective representation. Furthermore, it is unclear
whether a plaintiff class would be able to be certified in an as-applied class
action against a voter identification law. Some precedent indicates that a
putative voter identification class may fail on commonality grounds due to
the necessity of a case-by-case examination of the burdens imposed by the
voter identification law.
Thus, the reference in Crawford to a future as-applied solution is
illusory. The invocation of an as-applied challenge as an adequate safeguard
to protecting the right to vote in unconstitutional applications is an attractive
idea on its face. But upon closer examination, it is a hollow promise, a legal
chimera. 64
Nor have other softening devices proven to be greatly successful. Consider
the “Election Identification Certificate,” which Texas created apparently to blunt
the argument that its identification law constituted a poll tax. The certificate is
62

Stewart v. Marion County, 2008 WL 4690984:
[T]he Court concludes that even though Plaintiff asserts an “as applied” challenge to the
Voter ID Law, the reasoning in Crawford still applies to Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff has not
designated any evidence to demonstrate a burden that, on balance, outweighs the State’s
interest in protecting against voter fraud. In his briefs, Plaintiff tries to demonstrate that he,
and many other voters, have traveled great distances and paid fees they could not afford in
order to get a free, valid Indiana photographic identification. However, as previously
discussed, Plaintiff represents himself only, and not the rights of other voters. Additionally,
Plaintiff succeeded in obtaining valid identification because he currently possesses a valid
Indiana photographic identification. Ultimately, the burden on Plaintiff evidenced here is
not significantly distinguishable from that of the plaintiffs in Crawford. As a result, the
State’s interest in protecting against voter fraud is “sufficiently weighty” to justify its
requirement that Plaintiff present photographic identification in order to vote.

63

Julien Kern, As-Applied Constitutional Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential
Solutions to Challenging Voter Identification Laws After Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2009).
64
Id. at 668-69.
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available without a fee to those voters who do not have a state identity card. The
voter still must pay whatever fees are necessary for documentation to prove
citizenship and identity to obtain the EIC card.
According to an investigation by the Texas Observer, the Texas Department
of Public Safety “has issued only 653 EICs across the state—only one ID for every
930 Texans who lack voter ID. In a survey of 46 counties that issue their own EICs,
the Observer found that many elections administrators had little to no familiarity
with the ID, and some expressed surprise that anyone would inquire about it.” 65
Next consider the “reasonable impediment” exemptions involved in the
North Carolina and South Carolina voting laws. A federal district court recently
denied a preliminary injunction to stop North Carolina from using its new voter
identification law until a ruling on the merits on the challenge to the law. The
district court relied heavily on the “reasonable impediment” rules in denying the
preliminary injunction:
When the State did not have a reasonable impediment exception, NAACP
Plaintiffs claimed the burden imposed on the socioeconomically
disadvantaged was too severe. Now that the State has sought to
accommodate these voters with the reasonable impediment exception,
Plaintiffs claim that the exception swallows the rule and that the State need
not have a photo-ID requirement. This court finds any alleged diminution
in achieving the State’s purported interest to be more than offset by the
reduction of burden achieved by the reasonable impediment exception. 66
While confusion reigns in North Carolina over how the state will actually
implement its voter identification program in the first few elections, 67 in South
Carolina elected officials do little to publicize the reasonable impediment
exemption from the law. A report by Think Progress noted that South Carolina’s
voter information program barely mentions the reasonable impediment exemption
in fine print in voter information, and the governor of the state has incorrectly stated
that voters must have photographic identification in order to be allowed to vote. 68
65

Hannah McBride, Years After Voter ID Law, Alternative IDs Confuse Texas County Officials,
TEXAS OBSERVER, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.texasobserver.org/election-identification-certificatesvoter-id/.
66
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL
204481, *11 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
67
Pam Fessler, Election Officials Tackle Confusing Voter ID Laws in North Carolina, NPR Mar. 4
http://www.npr.org/2016/03/03/469083115/election-officials-help-north-carolina-voters2016,
tackle-confusing-voter-id-laws.
68
Kira Lerner, South Carolina Voters are Getting Misleading Instructions About Voter ID, THINK
PROGRESS, Feb. 19, 2016, http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2016/02/19/3750017/south-carolinavoters-are-getting-misleading-instructions-about-voter-id/; see also Ari Berman, 67,536 Reasons
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Some voters are confused, with confusion beginning with the fact that some voters
do not know what the word “impediment” means and therefore have difficult time
taking advantage of the exception. 69
In response to the Think Progress article, the South Carolina Election
Commission wrote on Twitter incorrect information, stating that if a voter does not
bring the right photographic identification to the polls, “you’ll have to show it later
for your vote to count.” 70 This is not true for voters who take advantage of the
reasonable impediment exemption. The state then corrected this misinformation in
a follow-up tweet. 71
This raises a related problem: election administrator and poll worker error.
A poll worker in South Carolina expressed concern that given the poor information
campaign of South Carolina officials, many poll workers will not know that voters
may cast ballots without a photographic identification upon signing an affidavit of
a reasonable impediment to voting. 72
Consider this case from Texas, where state law requires poll workers to
accept identification from voters whose names on the rolls are “substantially
similar” 73 to those on a photographic identification card:
A strict interpretation of the law ended up disenfranchising Taylor
Thompson, a student at Texas State University in San Marcos. Thompson’s
name on the voter registration card she received in the mail was incorrectly
spelled “Tayllor Megan Rose Thompson.” Because it didn’t match her
name on her photo ID, which is “Taylor Megon-Rose Thompson,” she was
barred from voting. Nor was she offered a provisional ballot, which would

Racism is Still Alive in South Carolina, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2016,
http://www.thenation.com/article/63756-reasons-why-racism-is-still-alive-in-south-carolina/;
69
Author interview with Kathleen Unger of VoteRiders, March 5, 2016.
70
https://twitter.com/scvotes/status/701065823968956416?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw. The exchange
over Twitter with the author of the Think Progress article is instructive.
71
https://twitter.com/scvotes/status/701067445788917761?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw.
72
Zachary Roth, Confusion over South Carolina Voter ID Law Could Keep Voters Away, MSNBC,
Feb. 12, 2016, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/confusion-over-south-carolina-id-law-could-keepvoters-away (“There’s concern, too, that some poll workers might not enforce the law correctly.
People without ID are supposed to be allowed to vote simply by signing an affidavit saying they had
a ‘reasonable impediment’ that stopped them from getting one and explaining what the impediment
was. They can give essentially any reason. But Leonard, a trained poll worker herself, said she’s not
at all confident that all poll workers will know the rules. ‘It’s not clear to poll workers that they
should accept any reason,” she said, “It’s not emphasized in the poll worker training.’”).
73
TEXAS ELEC. CODE § 63.001(c), http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/EL/htm/EL.63.htm.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2743946

SOFTENING VOTER ID LAWS THROUGH LITIGATION

have allowed her to return in the next six days to straighten out the problem
and have her vote counted. 74
The law required Texas election officials to offer Ms. Thompson that provisional
ballot; 75 it was not incumbent upon her to ask for it.
Finally, this problem with administrative discretion appears no better in
Wisconsin, where the state Supreme Court engaged in creative statutory
interpretation to require its Department of Motor Vehicles to exercise discretion to
assist voters in obtaining full documentation required to obtain a state-issued voteridentification cards.
The trial court in one of the two cases raising problems with the Wisconsin
process began its opinion with this vignette:
Mrs. Smith has lived in Milwaukee since 2003. She was born at home, in
Missouri, in 1916. In her long life she has survived two husbands, and she
has left many of the typical traces of her life in public records. But, like
many older African Americans born in the South, she does not have a birth
certificate or other documents that would definitively prove her date and
place of birth. After Wisconsin’s voter ID law took effect, she needed a
photo ID to vote. So she entered the ID Petition Process (IDPP) at the
Wisconsin Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to get a Wisconsin ID.
DMV employees were able to find Mrs. Smith’s record in the 1930 census,
but despite their sustained efforts, they could not link Mrs. Smith to a
Missouri birth record, so they did not issue her a Wisconsin ID. She is
unquestionably a qualified Wisconsin elector, and yet she could not vote in
2016. Because she was born in the South, barely 50 years after slavery, her
story is particularly compelling. But it is not unique: Mrs. Smith is one of
about 100 qualified electors who tried to but could not obtain a Wisconsin
ID for the April 2016 primary. 76
As to the scope of the problem in Wisconsin, the trial court found a few
hundred voters who had trouble navigating the process to obtain an identification
from the Wisconsin DMV. 77 The judge described the type of voters facing problems
as follows:
74

Zachary Roth, Scattered Problems for Voting at Polling Sites, Especially in the South, MSNBC,
Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/scattered-problems-voters-polling-sites-especiallythe-south.
75
TEXAS
ELEC.
CODE
§
63.001(g)(1).,
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/EL/htm/EL.63.htm.
76
One Wisconsin Institute, 2016 WL 4059222, *2.
77

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2743946

RICHARD L. HASEN

16

The petitioners in suspended or denied status were the ones who faced
serious roadblocks in the IDPP: their birth records did not exist, or those
records did not perfectly match their names or other aspects of their
identities, such as Social Security records. The problems arose because the
DMV evaluated IDPP petitions for voting IDs by using the same
identification standards that it applied to applications for Wisconsin driver
licenses and standard IDs. To acquire any one of these products from the
DMV, a person must prove both their identity and their legal presence in
the United States. Thus, the DMV refused to issue IDs to IDPP petitioners
until CAFU could confirm their identities with a match to a valid birth
record, or to some equivalently secure alternative. Some petitioners simply
could not meet the DMV’s standard of proof, and so they could not obtain
free IDs.
*The lack of a valid birth record correlated strikingly, yet predictably, with
minority status. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Puerto Rico, Cook
County, Illinois, and states with a history of de jure segregation have
systematic deficiencies in their vital records systems. Voters born in those
places were commonly unable to confirm their identities under the DMV’s
standards. For example, many African American residents in Wisconsin
were born in Cook County or in southern states. And many of the state’s
Latino residents were born in Puerto Rico. Id. As of April 2016, more than
half of the petitioners who had entered the IDPP were born in Illinois,
Mississippi, or a southern state that had a history of de jure segregation. 78
The problems each disenfranchised voter faces is fact specific, making class
action lawsuits to solve identification problems difficult. Administrative discretion,
lack of understanding by voters, and lack of publicity leave many administrative
softening devices underutilized and unfairly implemented.

Many people successfully navigated the IDPP. Out of 1,389 petitions for free IDs, the
DVM issued IDs to 1,132 petitioners. Of the petitioners who applied, 487 had to go through
“adjudication,” which included a full investigation by CAFU and a final decision from Jim
Miller, the head of the DMV’s Bureau of Field Services (a different unit from CAFU). 230
of the petitioners who went through adjudication received IDs; 257 petitioners did not.
DMV records indicate that 98 of the petitioners who did not receive IDs after adjudication
cancelled their petitions.
Id. at *12 (citations omitted)
78
Id. at *12-13 (citations omitted).
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In sum, softening in practice so far has not fixed problems for voters facing
special burdens to produce identification to vote, and it will take considerable effort
to make these devices viable means for avoiding disenfranchisement. 79
It will take detailed empirical study of how jurisdictions handle softening
devices before we can have confidence that particular means of avoiding
disenfranchisement are successful. At this point, the evidence does not inspire
confidence.

III.
INSTEAD OF SOFTENING, A NEW BALANCE
The last Part demonstrated that softening of voter identification laws in
theory does not necessarily lead to softening of voter identification laws in practice.
Difficulties of proof, administrative problems, and poll worker error all make voter
identification softening devices less than ideal to ameliorate the harshness of voter
identification laws for those facing difficulty producing the right document to vote.
Further, these laws impose other social costs. They suck up resources of
voting rights groups and others, sometimes quite significant, to fight for individual
rights to vote. 80 They are also expensive for states and local governments to
administer. A proposed Missouri voter identification law has been estimated to cost
$17 in its first three years. 81 And each fight threatens to disenfranchise a voter who
cannot put up with the administrative hassle.
As historian Allan Lichtman noted in a recent court filing in the Wisconsin
case, the Wisconsin DMV’s improper decisions to deny voter identification cards
to 19 applicants who sought to obtain the cards worked an unprecedented
disenfranchisement:
Although 19 outright denials may seem like a small number, as far as I know
it represents the first time since the era of the literacy test that state officials
have told eligible voters that they cannot exercise their fundamental right to
vote – not in the next election, probably not ever — … I am unaware in the
post-voting rights era of other examples of state officials telling eligible
79

One of the judges on the Fifth Circuit panel who believed that softening the law as a good enough
remedy, cited an earlier draft of this article, remarking: “I also disagree with the opposite criticism
that this interbranch engagement ameliorates too little, though that argument is contributory.”
Veasey v. Abbott, 2016 WL 3923868, *44 (Higgonson, J., concurring).
80
Consider, for example, the work of VoteRiders, http://www.voteriders.org/, whose sole mission
is to get voters the identification materials they need in states which have adopted strict, tough voter
identification laws.
81
Jon Swedien, Bill Requiring Photo ID at Polls Advances in Legislature, SPRINGFIELD NEWSLEADER, Feb. 6, 2016, http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/02/06/billrequiring-photo-id-polls-advances-legislature/79896192/.
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citizens of their state that they cannot vote because they fail to meet an external
criteri[on] established by the state — unrelated to age, residency or other
objective qualification for voting. 82

It is hard to quantify just how many people are deterred from voting because
of strict voter identification laws, as well as how many people who would otherwise
deterred would have been able to take advantage of one of these softening devices.
(This does not even count voters who cannot vote because they have been deterred
by registration requirements, such as those in Kansas, requiring documentary proof
of U.S. citizenship before voting. 83) But a focus on aggregate numbers puts the
emphasis in the wrong place, away from individual voters’ rights and dignity and
on naked partisan effects.
This debate over numbers parallels the focus of some opponents of voter
identification laws on whether voter identification laws will depress turnout, and if
so, whether the turnout can skew the election in favor of Republicans and away
from Democrats. 84 Such laws certainly appear to be intended by many Republicans
to make it harder to vote, 85 even if they do not necessarily have that effect. But this
misses the point: there is no good reason why any voters, regardless of party, should
face significant hurdles to voting for no good reason.
82

See One Wisconsin Now v. Nichol, Case 15-CV-324, is Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for
Miscellaneous Relief, Motion for Partial Reinstatement of Voter ID Claims filed Feb. 24, 2016,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/PlaintiffsBriefinSupportofMotionforMi
scellaneousReliefMotionforPartialReinstatementofVoterID.pdf, quoting Feb. 16, 2016 Expert
Rebuttal Report of Allan J. Lichtman, at 15-16 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
83
Sari Horowitz, Want to Vote in this State? You Have to Have a Passport or Dig Up a Birth
Certificate, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/02/19/how-kansas-has-become-a-battleground-state-for-voting-rights/.
84
On the difficulty of determining how voter identification laws affect turnout, see Robert S.
Erickson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification—Voter Turnout
Debate, 8 ELECTION LAW JOURNAL 85 (2009) (“We should be wary of claims – from all sides of
the controversy – regarding turnout effects from voter ID laws.... [T]he data are not up to the task
of making a compelling statistical argument.”). For a recent draft study provisionally accepted at
the Journal of Politics finding a turnout effect which skews against Democratic and minority voters,
see Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identification Laws and the
Suppression
of
Minority
Votes,
draft
available
http://pages.ucsd.edu/~zhajnal/page5/documents/VoterIDLawsandtheSuppressionofMinorityVotes
.pdf. See also Janie Valencia & Alissa Scheller, Fewer Democrats are Voting This Year in
(Surprise!) States with New Strict Voter Laws, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 3, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/voter-id-laws-democraticturnout_us_56d8c5bae4b0000de403f238. A study like this one does not account for other reasons
turnout may be down aside from restrictive voting laws. For example, Democratic turnout may have
been down in the Democratic primary in Texas because neither Hillary Clinton nor Bernie Sanders
expended great resources in the large and expensive state, but Republicans saw a contested
presidential primary race including a great push for votes by U.S. Senator from Texas Ted Cruz.
85
See HASEN, supra note 13, ch 2.
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Consider those 19 disenfranchised voters in Wisconsin. Are they being
disenfranchised for a good reason? And what of eligible voters who are the victim
of administrative incompetence, like Ms. Thompson in Texas, or voters who simply
forget their correct identification at home, and cannot afford the few hours to wait
in line and return to vote or show up at a government agency in the requisite time
period at the voter’s own expense to prove identity? Why is it not unconstitutional
to put new roadblocks in front of voters without adequate justification? The
evidence that such laws prevent impersonation fraud or instill voter confidence is
essentially non-existent. 86
As I have argued elsewhere, 87 we need a new approach to potentially
burdensome voting laws which makes the state come forward with actual evidence
that they are necessary:
In reviewing laws which impose burdens on voters, courts should adopt
something along the lines of the “strict scrutiny light” standard which Judge
[Terence] Evans advanced in his Seventh Circuit Crawford dissent. When
a legislature passes an election-administration law discriminating against a
party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters, courts should read the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to require the legislature
to produce real and substantial evidence that it has a good reason for
burdening voters and that its means are closely connected to achieving those
ends. This approach would not require delving into the motives of
legislators to determine if they were merely self-interested and had passed
laws to hurt the other party, as opposed to being motivated by a desire to
prevent fraud, save money, or instill voter confidence. Instead, evidence of
such intent should prompt courts to look skeptically upon asserted state
interests unsupported by actual evidence. 88

86

On the lack of evidence of impersonation fraud, see HASEN, supra note 1313, ch 2.; Justin Levitt,
A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible Incidents Out of One
WASH.
POST,
Aug.
6,
2014,
Billion
Ballots
Cast,
WONKBLOG,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-ofvoter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/;
Stephen
Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public
Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008);
Charles Stewart III, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Nathaniel Persily, Revisiting Public Opinion on
Voter Identification in an Era of Increasing Partisan Polarization, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1455 (2016)..
87
Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make
It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014) (citations
http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/race-or-party-how-courts-should-think-aboutomitted),
republican-efforts-to-make-it-harder-to-vote-in-north-carolina-and-elsewhere/.
88
Id.
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Sam Issacharoff, building an analogy from antitrust law, has developed a
similar “rule of reason” framework for evaluating when courts should intervene to
block cutbacks to voting rights to politically vulnerable populations:
Two sets of cases provide the backdrop for the rule of reason analysis in
voting rights law, one a statutory claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, the other a constitutional claim. Each involves a challenge to altered
rules for the ability to cast a vote, with one dealing with voter identification
requirements and the other with the availability of early in-person voting.
What unifies them for purposes here is that both apply doctrines not
generally directed at voting practices to craft a nuanced test for the
relationship between the stated state objective and the burdens.
Each line of cases begins by identifying a threshold burden on the franchise
and then shifts the bulk of the judicial inquiry to the state’s justification for
the burden. Each eschews any rigid ruling that the claim to a particular form
of identification or a particular form of early voting is an entitlement. At the
same time, each carefully sidesteps any finding of improper purpose or
animus on the part of state officials. Rather, each concludes by finding that
the state fails to meet a burden of justification for proving that the claimed
state objectives are best addressed at the cost of the associated burdens upon
prospective voters. 89
These new kinds of approaches, focusing on each voter’s right to vote free
of unnecessary burdensome restrictions, is better than a deferential approach to
voting cutbacks coupled with softeners.
In the end, the courts are misguided in relying upon softening devices to
justify otherwise upholding unnecessary voting restrictions. The softening devices
do not appear to be helping as much as the judges and justices may have envisioned,
and in the meantime, an uncertain number of voters are being disenfranchised,
inconvenienced, and discouraged from voting for no good reason. It would be better
to throw these laws out completely than to pretend softening devices have
significantly eased their ill effects.

89

Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016), draft available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2788808
(manuscript at 14-15).
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